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Abstract
We study immigration policy in a small open receiving economy under self-selection
of migrants. We show that the immigration policy choice a¤ects and is a¤ected by the
migratory decisions of skilled and unskilled foreign workers. From this interaction mul-
tiple equilibria may arise, which are driven by the nativesexpectations on the size and
skill composition of the incoming migrant population (and, hence, on the welfare e¤ects
of immigration). In particular, pessimistic (optimistic) beliefs induce a country to im-
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rm initial beliefs. This self-ful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1 Introduction
Immigration policy varies across receiving countries, sometimes to a large extent. In demo-
cratic societies, these di¤erences reect the perception of the relative costs and benets of
immigration in terms of economic performance, redistributive consequences, e¤ects on public
nances, labor market, crime, capacity to integrate, etc.1 Costs and benets are a¤ected by
both the size and the quality of the migrant population. In particular, several theoretical
arguments suggest that "skilled" migrants are more benecial to the receiving country than
"unskilled" migrants, such as: positive spillovers of skilled migrants for the receiving economy,
higher production complementarities between skilled labor and capital, greater exibility of
the skilled labor market. Another popular argument is the scal cost that low-skill migrants
potentially impose on natives when the receiving country implements redistributive policies
or other welfare programs favoring low-skill workers (and thus low-skill migrants).2
If unskilled migrants are more costly (or less benecial) than skilled migrants, it would be
reasonable to expect that, over time as well as across countries, an "adverse" skill composition
be associated with more pessimistic views on immigration among natives and more restrictive
immigration policies. Empirical evidence conrms this claim. In a two-century historical
overview of migration inows, Hatton and Williamson (2004) show that a deterioration of
the quality of immigrants has been concomitant with stronger opposition to immigration
and with a tightening of immigration policy. More recently, Hanson, Scheve and Slaughter
(2007) emphasize the role of the skill composition of the immigrant population in determining
individualsviews on immigration within the states of the US.3 They nd that individuals
in the US are more opposed to immigration in states with relatively less skilled immigrant
populations. As shown in Facchini and Mayda (2008), similar results hold in an analysis of
individual attitudes towards immigration in OECD countries.
This, however, is only part of the story. Over the last few years a growing literature
has focused attention on the determinants of migratory choices across skilled and unskilled
1See Facchini and Mayda (2008).
2For a survey of these arguments see Borjas (1995).
3A growing recent empirical literature studies the determinants of individual attitudes towards immigration.
This literature suggests that attitudes depend on several factors such as individualsskill level, the exposure
of an individual to the scal consequences of immigration and the size of the immigrant population. Recent
contributions include Scheve and Slaughter (2001), Mayda (2006), ORourke and Sinnott (2006), Facchini and
Mayda (2009).
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migrants.4 A key empirical nding is that the choice of low-skill migrants is more constrained
relative to high-skill migrants by such factors as geographical distance, cultural distance,
colonial origin, network e¤ects (because of more stringent poverty constraints or lower adap-
tation capacity to diversity). While other factors, such as technology, may also limit the
destination choice of skilled migrants, the evidence on the actual distribution of foreign born
workers shows that unskilled migrants concentrate in fewer receiving countries relative to the
skilled.5 Put it di¤erently, this evidence conrms the presumption that -in relative terms-
high-skill migrants are more internationally mobile and, hence, more responsive to changes
in immigration policy in receiving countries.
It is, therefore, well possible that immigration policy itself a¤ects the migration choices
of skilled and unskilled foreign workers, which alter the skill composition of migrants and
feed back into attitudes and policies in the receiving country. This consideration leads us to
raise the following questions that constitute the focus of the present work: What is the e¤ect
of immigration policy on the skill composition of the migrant labor force? Can immigration
policy be driven by self-fullling beliefs? Can a prejudice pro or against immigration be
endogenous?
Notwithstanding the di¤erence in the welfare e¤ects of migrants with di¤erent skills, non-
selective policies have historically been the dominant form of restriction to immigration in
OECD countries, notable exceptions being Australia, Canada and New Zealand. The ex-
tensive and protracted use of non-discriminatory policies is essential in understanding the
self-fullling nature of immigration policy. In a nutshell, we argue that non-selective re-
strictions worsen the skill composition of immigration and, hence, have a negative e¤ect
on natives immigration sentiments. These insights may help rationalize the cross-country
variation in attitudes towards immigration and choices of immigration policy.6
Specically, we build a model of immigration which allows us to discuss the relationship
between the migratory choices of skilled and unskilled foreign workers, natives beliefs on
4See, among others, Mayda and Patel (2007), Belot and Hatton (2008), Doquier et al. (2008), McKenzie
and Rapoport (2006), Grogger and Hanson (2008).
5Docquier et al. (2008) use a dataset describing the stock of foreign born workers in all OECD countries
by education level and country of origin. They compute bilateral concentration indexes, which capture how
migrants from each source country are distributed within all OECD nations, for both low and high-skill foreign
born workers. Through a detailed comparison of these indexes, they show that unskilled migrants tend to be
more concentrated than skilled migrants.
6For instance, according to the ISSP National Identity Survey 1995, Australia, Canada and New Zealand
are among the less hostile countries towards immigration. See ORourke and Sinnott (2006).
3
the benets of immigration and immigration policy in the destination countries. The size
and the skill composition of the incoming migrant labor force a¤ect the welfare of a society
and hence its choice of migratory restrictions. This choice, however, in turn a¤ects the
size and the quality of the migrant population. From this mutual interaction multiple (self-
conrming) equilibria may arise, which are triggered by nativesbeliefs on the welfare e¤ects of
immigration. In particular, if a society believes that immigration will be mostly unskilled and
costly (i.e. has an anti-immigration prejudice), it will choose high restrictions to the entry of
foreign workers. In equilibrium, strict immigration policies that are not skill selective reduce
the number of high-skill migrants (for reasons which will soon be claried), in which case
immigration will be relatively more costly and social beliefs will be self-fullled. If instead a
society believes that immigration will be benecial (i.e. has a pro-immigration prejudice), it
will set low restrictions, thus increasing the number of high-skill migrants and making these
beliefs self-conrmed as well.
Our analysis begins with a standard model of immigration with a sending and a receiving
country as a useful benchmark (Section 2). The receiving economy is populated by - skilled
and unskilled - workers and capitalists. The pool of workers -potential immigrants- populating
the sending country is composed of high and low-skill workers. The model has two key
features. The rst is that both migration choices and migration policy are endogenous.
The former depend on the economic incentives that foreign workers face, and on the policy
regulating migratory ows enacted in the receiving country.7 Immigration policy in our set-
up is parametrized by a cost borne by (high and low skill) immigrants once in the destination
country. The second important feature of the model is the assumption that low-skill migrants
are more costly than high-skill migrants. This is rationalized via the existence in the receiving
country of social policies, redistributing income in favor of low-skill (native and foreign)
workers.8 In this standard framework, we characterize the politically-optimal immigration
policy for the host country.
7While most theoretical contributions on immigrants self-selection are based on a partial equilibrium
analysis, we consider the e¤ects of immigration policy on the equilibrium wage and how, in turn, this a¤ects
economic incentives to migration for skilled and unskilled foreign workers (and, hence, the skill composition
of migrants in the receiving region). On this, see also the recent works by Bellettini and Berti Ceroni (2007)
and Bianchi (2007).
8While, as discussed earlier, the scal cost of low-skill immigration is a realistic feature of our model, the
channel through which unskilled immigration negatively a¤ects nativeswelfare is immaterial to the results of
this paper.
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The standard model neglects two salient features of migratory choices discussed above.
First, foreign workers often choose not only whether to migrate or not but also, to a certain
extent, which country to move to. Secondly, high-skill and low-skill migrants are not equally
free in making this choice. In Section 3, we extend the benchmark model in order to capture
these features. We assume that the sending and receiving countries are, respectively, part
of larger sending and receiving regions. In particular, the receiving country is a small open
economy which shares the same preferences and technology with the rest of the receiving
region and can decide independently its immigration policy, without a¤ecting the rest of the
region. In this framework we capture the higher international mobility of high-skill migrants
by assuming that they can choose to emigrate to a larger set of destination countries relative
to unskilled migrants. As a result of this assumption, a new e¤ect of immigration policy
on the composition of incoming foreign labor force arises. A restrictive immigration policy
in the small open destination country will reduce the number of high-skill workers, as they
will choose to migrate where restrictions are lower (crowding out e¤ect). In contrast, a soft
immigration policy will increase the number of high-skill migrants, in that it will attract them
from the rest of the region (crowding in e¤ect). This mechanism is at the root of the results
we obtain.
We prove that, when a small economy in the receiving world decides immigration policy
independently and taking as given the policy of the rest of the region, multiple equilibria
arise which depend on the countrys expectations on the quality of immigration -i.e. the
expected number of high-skill foreign workers potentially entering the destination country.
In the rst equilibrium, the economy benets of a high-skill immigration boom which is
driven by optimistic expectations on the number of high-skill migrants. If the policy maker
anticipates that a relatively large number of highly skilled foreign workers will be entering the
country (and, hence, that the e¤ects of immigration on the destination country will be largely
positive), it will rationally set low restrictions to immigration. The e¤ect of low barriers to
immigration will be to attract -highly mobile- skilled migrants (crowding in e¤ect) and, hence,
to validate initial beliefs. In the second (and opposite) equilibrium, the small economy can
be stuck in an unskilled immigration trap, driven by pessimistic expectations. In particular,
suppose that the government has pessimistic beliefs about the quality of immigration. The
rational response to this belief would be to impose higher barriers to immigration than the rest
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of the region (as the presence of the welfare state costs of a mostly unskilled migrant inow
may render immigration more costly to the destination country). Given the skilled migrants
freedom of choice, this policy will have the e¤ect of crowding them out. The composition of
immigration in this country will then be biased towards low-skill immigrants, thus validating
the initial pessimistic belief. We show that welfare is lowest for the receiving country under
the "unskilled immigration trap" and highest under the "high-skill immigration boom".
A key insight follows from this analysis which is radically di¤erent from the simpler
standard model of immigration. The self-fullling mechanism described above may sustain
the endogenous formation of a prejudice pro or against immigration. Given the nature of the
equilibrium, these prejudices will be di¢ cult to change and, therefore, even small di¤erences
in initial perceptions may induce large and persistent di¤erences in immigration policy and
outcomes across countries. In particular, our analysis raises the theoretical possibility that the
hostility against immigrants may have resulted from a combination of pessimistic expectations
and the non-selective barriers to immigration historically adopted by most receiving countries.
This is complementary to explanations that emphasize the role of "fundamentals", such as
the size of redistributive programs or the substitutability between natives and migrants in
labor markets, as determinants of public perceptions of immigration.
Finally, in Section 4 we comment on the robustness of our results. In particular we show
that, while our key nding is robust to di¤erent or more general theoretical frameworks, the
multiplicity of equilibria disappears if the government introduces a discriminatory immigra-
tion policy that selects for the skills of foreign workers. This is important for two reasons.
First, while (as noticed by Hatton and Williamson, 2004) family reunication still constitutes
a major plank of immigration policy for permanent immigrants, policies that select for the
skills of foreign workers are becoming empirically more relevant in recent years, as a growing
number of Western countries are changing their rules on immigration (e.g. the recent proposal
of the Blue Card in the European Union). Second, this extension highlights a novel e¤ect of
skill selective policies on destination countries. Suppose that a receiving economy has (his-
torically) in place a non discriminatory policy and is stuck in an unskilled immigration trap,
as dened above. A switch from a non discriminatory to a skill selective policy improves the
quality of migrants and the attitudes of natives towards immigration and, ultimately, may
eradicate the prejudice and dig the economy out of the trap with unambiguously positive
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e¤ects on nativeswelfare.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we introduce the
benchmark model, analyze the migration choice of skilled and unskilled foreign workers and
nd the politically optimal immigration policy for the receiving country. In Section 3 we
extend the model to consider a small open receiving economy, analyze the new migration
choice, and derive and discuss the policy equilibria for the small economy. Section 4 discusses
the extensions to our framework. Concluding remarks are in Section 5, while all proofs are
in the technical appendix.
2 A Benchmark Model of Immigration Policy
Let us assume that the world is made up of a receiving country, or "home", (H) and a
sending country, "foreign" (F ). The focus of our analysis is on the e¤ects of migratory ows
and immigration policy on the receiving country.
There are three key sets of actors in the economy: agents in the receiving country, that
will be referred to as natives, who express their preferences over immigration policy; foreign
workers, who choose whether to migrate or not; and the home government, which decides
immigration policy to maximize (a weighted average of) nativeswelfare. In H there are NH
workers, a fraction of whom are skilled. We denote by SH the number of skilled, and by
UH = NH  SH the number of unskilled native workers. Each native worker is endowed with
one unit of labor, which is inelastically supplied on the (competitive) labor market. Individual
labor supply is higher in e¢ ciency units for skilled agents than for unskilled (see below). H
is also populated by a number K of native capitalists, each of whom is endowed with one
unit of capital. Population in F is made up of workers, denoted by NF = SF +UF , with the
same notation for skilled/unskilled as above. Nativesand migrantsutility is linear in their
(disposable) income, which is entirely spent to consume the unique nal good produced in
the economy.
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2.1 Home Technology and Social Policy
The nal good is produced competitively via a Cobb-Douglas technology in e¤ective labor
(L) and in a xed factor (capital, denoted by K):9
Y = KL1 : (1)
From rst order conditions we obtain factor demands, for respectively capital, unskilled and
skilled labor as
rH = 

K
L
 1
; (2)
wH"u = (1  )

K
L

"u; (3)
wH"s = (1  )

K
L

"s; (4)
where rH is capital rent, wH = (1 ) (K=L) is the level of wage per e¢ ciency unit of labor,
and "s and "u denote the productivities of skilled and unskilled workers respectively, with
"s > "u. E¤ective labor supply of natives is
LH = "sSH + "uUH : (5)
Total e¤ective labor supply (L) includes foreign labor supply in addition to natives, where
foreign labor supply is endogenously determined.
Last, we assume that country H has a social policy that redistributes labor income from
high-skill to low-skill workers. The welfare system in the receiving country is assumed to
be pre-existent to immigration.10 In particular, we suppose that this policy consists of an
exogenous and xed lump-sum transfer u to (native and foreign) unskilled workers which
9This type of technology is drawn from Bellettini-Berti Ceroni (2007). In Section 4 we discuss the case
of a technology that allows for complementarities between domestic skilled (unskilled) workers and foreign
unskilled (skilled) migrants.
10The assumption of an exogenous and xed welfare system is reasonable when the size of the migrant labor
force is low relative to the size of the native population. When this is not the case, one can think that the
domestic government chooses the social policy having in mind its e¤ect on migratory ows. We do not pursue
this question here. Papers studying the joint determination of immigration and redistributive policy include
Casella (2005) and Armenter and Ortega (2010).
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is nanced through a proportional tax  2 [0; 1] on the labor income of native high-skill
workers.11 As we will see below, social spending in presence of immigration depends on the
(exogenous) size of the transfer (u) as well as on the (endogenous) number of unskilled
migrants entering country H. To introduce the balanced budget constraint in presence of
immigration, therefore, we rst need to deal with the migration choice.
2.2 The Migration Choice
We now introduce the possibility of international labor movements and study the determi-
nants of migratory decisions. Migration is assumed to be a one-time and non-reversible
decision. The general idea is that immigrants who have high levels of productivity not only
benet from emigrating, but they can also make a signicant contribution to the economy
of the receiving country. On the other hand, even those immigrants who lack the skills that
employers in the host country demand can still choose to migrate to receive social assistance
programs. In this case, natives may be concerned that immigration will increase the costs
associated with income maintenance policy in the receiving country.
In F the wage rate is assumed exogenous and denoted by w. We call the productivities
for foreign skilled and unskilled workers respectively "s; "u. For simplicity we assume that the
former have positive productivity, while foreign unskilled are unproductive (i.e. "s > "u = 0).
We will discuss the case in which "u > 0 in Section 4.12 If foreign workers choose to remain
in the sending country, their wages are respectively given by w"s and w"u = 0.
Each immigrant i - whether skilled or unskilled - faces a psychological cost to leave her
own country, i, which is uniformly distributed in [0; ]. In addition, the government in H
can set up an immigration policy which is parametrized by a cost borne by immigrants once
in the new country, H 2 R+. One can interpret H in several ways, from the number of
bureaucratic procedures (i.e. the time a worker needs to spend applying for a work permit
in the receiving country, which implies an opportunity cost for the applicant), to laws that
a¤ect the life of immigrants in the host country, such as the number of years to obtain voting
11Naturally, one can model the social policy in the receiving country in a number of di¤erent ways (for
instance, by introducing a proportional income tax, or taxing capital rather than skilled labor, or imposing
redistributive taxation to high-skill migrants in addition to skilled natives, etc.). These alternative formaliza-
tions would generally not alter the logic of our results as long as the social policy implies a net transfer of
resources from natives to unskilled foreign workers.
12 In particular, we will argue that introducing "u > 0, a part from rendering the model analytically less
manageable, does not alter our results.
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rights or citizenship. This policy is assumed to be non-discriminatory.13
We start by considering the policy variable H as exogenous and look at migratory de-
cisions. In the next section we endogenize the policy choice. A skilled foreign worker i will
migrate if and only if
wH"

s   H   i  w"s; (6)
while an unskilled foreign worker i will migrate if and only if
u   H   i  0: (7)
Quite naturally, foreign workers will migrate into H if and only if the utility they can
reach there -the (endogenous) home wage rate times their own productivity or the lump-sum
transfer in the case of unskilled migrants, minus the costs of migration- is higher than the
utility they can achieve in the sending country -the (exogenous) foreign wage rate times their
productivity.
We can then nd the two threshold values of , call them s and u respectively for skilled
and unskilled, such that all those below that value are willing to migrate. We have
s = (wH   w) "s   H (8)
and
u = u   H : (9)
All skilled workers whose  is lower than s, and all unskilled workers whose  is lower than
u are willing to migrate.14 If both skilled and unskilled foreign workers are distributed
uniformly in [0; ], the number of skilled and unskilled migrants will be respectively (s=)SF
and (u=)UF .15
13 In Section 4 and in the Conclusions we come back to the issue of prejudice and selective immigration
policies.
14Before proceeding let us just notice that condition (8) holds true to the extent that it is positive and lower
than . Whenever (wH   w) "s   H < 0, then s = 0, while if (wH   w) "s   H > , then s = . The
same is true, mutatis mutandis, for u.
15This model is compatible with several well-established empirical results. First, the data conrm that
high-skill migrants are highly responsive to wage earning di¤erences (Grogger and Hanson, 2008). Second,
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Last, we can nd the tax rate that balances the budget of the income support program in
presence of immigration. Social spending will be equal to the transfer per worker (u) times
the number of workers who benet from the transfer
 
UH +
 
u=

UF

, where the expression
in brackets denotes the total number of unskilled workers in country H (i.e. domestic and
foreign). A balanced budget implies the following tax rate on skilled labor:
 =
u

UH +
u

UF

"swHSH
; (10)
where u is itself a function of u.
2.3 The Politically Optimal Immigration Policy at Home
In this subsection we determine the politically optimal immigration policy for the receiving
country. Our rst step is to nd the equilibrium in the Home labor market and to investigate
the e¤ects of immigration policy (H).
The equilibrium in the domestic labor market with immigration is determined by the
intersection of the labor demand curve and the total (i.e. augmented for immigration) e¤ective
labor supply:
(
wH = (1  )
 
K
L

L = "sSH + "uUH + "

s
(wH w)"s H

SF ;
(11)
where we used the threshold value s given by condition (8) into the aggregate labor supply
in e¢ ciency units. Figure 1 provides a graphical intuition of the equilibrium in the domestic
labor market.
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
An increase in migratory costs (H) in the receiving country alters the equilibrium in
the domestic labor market and the two key prices in the model economy: the wage rate and
the rate of return on the xed factor. The policy variable H a¤ects directly the number of
immigrants (and, hence, the e¤ective labor supply) by changing the incentives to migrate.
the idea that the generosity of the welfare system in destination countries serves as a magnet to unskilled
migrants nds support in Boeri et al. (2002) and Cohen and Razin (2008).
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The higher H , the lower the labor supply and the higher the wage rate (i.e. the labor supply
curve in Figure 1 shifts upward). On the other hand, as the amount of capital is xed in the
receiving country, the lower labor supply depresses rents.16
The objective function of the government in the receiving country is a weighted sum of
the utilities of natives:
WH (H) = a  rH (H)K + (1  a) 

wH (H)LH   u
u (H)

UF

; (12)
where we substituted for  in condition (10) and where a 2 [0; 1] is the weight on the utility
of capitalists. Immigration has clear redistributive e¤ects on the native population. In
particular, the entry of foreign workers hurts native workers (by lowering their wage and, at
least for the skilled native workers, by increasing their tax rate ), and benets capitalists (by
raising their rent). The policy maker might not be neutral with respect to the distributional
consequences of immigration, which is captured by the weight a.17
The policy makers objective is the one of maximizing function (12). In particular, the
politically optimal immigration policy for the receiving country in this standard model, de-
noted by ^, is the one for which the marginal benet of the last immigrant admitted equalizes
its marginal cost. Moreover, parameters a and u a¤ect the optimal degree of policy restric-
tiveness: lower values of a and/or higher values of u lead to stricter immigration policies,
as they both represent an increase in the costs associated to immigration.18
3 Immigration Policy in a Small Open Economy
Most models of immigration policy have the basic structure discussed in the previous section.
However, as emphasized in the introduction, this structure fails to consider two relevant
features of migratory choices. First, a model with only one receiving country inevitably
neglects that some foreign workers may not only decide whether to migrate or not, but also
16We provide formal proofs of these standard results in Appendix A.
17Neutrality would imply a "political" weight equal to 1=2. As it is well understood from the theory of
collective action (Olson, 1965), however, governments tend to favor (i.e. give a higher weight in their objective
function to) better organized special interests. This may explain deviations from pure welfare maximization.
Facchini, Mayda and Mishra (2007) nd empirical evidence of the over-representation of capitalistsinterests
in immigration policy.
18Appendix A3 studies the conditions under which the solution to maximization of (12) is interior, and it
studies the e¤ects of a and u on ^.
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select their destination country. Secondly, low-skill migrants are generally more constrained
in their choice as to where to migrate compared to high-skill migrants. We now develop an
extension of the model above to incorporate these two aspects.
Consider country H and country F as, respectively, part of a large receiving region (R)
and large sending region (S). Countries H;F share with their respective regions the same
technology and preferences (which are still those introduced in the model of the previous
section), but their factor endowments are small compared to them (so that changes in these
countries do not a¤ect the rest of the regions). We can easily capture this structure by
imagining that H and F are two zero-mass countries in two intervals [0; 1], representing the
measures of both receiving and sending regions. Country H is allowed to set up immigration
policy H independently.
As the evidence provided in the introduction suggests, skilled foreign workers are more
internationally mobile relative to low-skill foreign workers as they have more freedom in
choosing their destination country. We capture this feature by assuming that there exists
a number of skilled foreign workers who choose not only whether to migrate or not, but
also which country to move to. In particular, we suppose that total skilled foreign workers
targeting H are SF	 where 	 > 1. This pool is made up of two subsets, one which is
"constrained" to migrating to country H, SF	 where 0  	 < 1, the other, SF
 
	 	,
which is "free" to target country H as well as the rest of region R. On the other hand, the
low skill foreign workers are constrained in their location decisions, so that unskilled foreign
workers populating F can only migrate to H.
We focus on the equilibrium characterization of country H while supposing that the rest
of the receiving region has been implementing the politically optimal immigration policy.
Since country H is simply a "scaled down" version of region R, our results on the politically
optimal policy of the previous section hold true for region R, and hence it will be R = ^.
We characterize the mutual interaction between the policy maker in country H and foreign
workers as a two-stage sequential game in which (i) the former chooses immigration policy
as a function of the expected migratory inows, (ii) the latter make their migratory choices
depending on this immigration policy. To nd the policy equilibria in country H, we analyze
the behavior of the policy maker and that of foreign workers as described in points (i) and
(ii), starting with the latter.
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3.1 The New Migration Choice
The migration choice of low-skill foreign workers is identical to that developed in the bench-
mark model. These workers migrate to H if and only if (7) holds, from which the threshold
u (below which unskilled foreign workers nd it protable to migrate) is determined as in
(9).
Similarly, skilled foreign workers targeting country H compare their pay-o¤ as immigrants
in country H to the one from their country of origin, and migrate if (6) holds, from which the
threshold (8) is determined. The number of constrained skilled migrants will then simply be 
s=

SF	. The subset of free skilled workers, however - SF
 
	 	 - also compare their
pay-o¤ in H with the one they would obtain in region R, and choose country H if the former
is higher than the latter. More formally,19
wH"

s   H   i > w^"s   ^  i (13)
()
H < ^
where w^ is the equilibrium wage in region R when R = ^. All free skilled workers whose
psychological cost is lower than s will enter country H if and only if H < ^ (crowding
in), while they will migrate to the rest of the region if and only if H > ^ (crowding out).
When H = ^, these workers will be indi¤erent between country H and region R, and we
assume that in this case they will distribute uniformly over the receiving region. The number
of skilled migrants, as a function of immigration restrictions in H, will then be
 
s=

SF	H
where
	H =
8>><>>:
	 if H < ^
1 if H = ^
	 if H > ^.
(14)
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
The sum of skilled and unskilled immigrants,
 
s=

SF	H +
 
u=

UF , is a piecewise
19The relation in (13) holds because, as can easily be veried, d ("swH) =dH < 1.
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continuous function in H whose only discontinuity point is H = ^. It can be interpreted
as the immigrantsbest-response function, as it captures the optimal reaction of immigrants
to any level of immigration restrictions chosen by the policy maker in H. What makes
this behavior interesting, and di¤erent from the one we have illustrated in the benchmark
model, is the function 	H (H) (depicted in Figure 2), which captures the pool of high-skill
foreign workers targeting country H as a function of migratory restrictions enacted in that
country. This function is responsible for the discontinuity of the immigrantsbest-response
to immigration restrictions at point H = ^.
3.2 The Immigration Policy Choice
We have seen above that the migration choice of foreign workers depends on the immigration
policy enacted in country H. In particular, internationally mobile skilled workers might
decide not to target country H when observing a comparatively stricter policy than in the
rest of the region and vice-versa. In this subsection we analyze how immigration policy in
country H depends on the expected migratory behavior of foreign workers, and prove an
"instrumental" result, which we are going to use in the next subsection.
We now prove that politically optimal migratory restrictions in country H, denoted by
~H , are a decreasing function of 	H , which captures the pool of high-skill foreign workers
that the policy maker expects will target H.20 Specically, the policy maker in the small
open economy H chooses restrictions ~H to maximize
WH = a  rH (H ;	H)K + (1  a) 

wH (H ;	H)LH   u
u (H)

UF

;
where rH =  [K= (LH + LF )]
 1, wH = (1  ) [K= (LH + LF )], and where LF = "s
 
s=

SF	H
is the expected foreign labor supply. The crucial di¤erence with respect to the policy prob-
lem illustrated in Section 2 is that here the immigration policy chosen by country H, ~H (),
depends on 	H . Clearly, when 	H = 1, the two maximum problems coincide, and hence
~H (	H = 1) = ^. The relationship between ~H and 	H is analyzed in the following
Lemma 1. The politically optimal immigration policy in country H, ~H (), is a decreasing
function of 	H 2

	;	

.
20Notice that the expected and actual number of free skilled foreign workers targeting H are both denoted
by 	H . Clearly, in equilibrium, they are indeed the same.
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INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE
The curve drawn in Figure 3 describes the locus of points in which immigration policy in
country H is politically optimal for any value of 	H between 	 and 	. A decrease in the
expected pool of skilled foreign workers (	H #) is associated to a tightening of immigration
policy (~H "), and vice-versa. Hence, Lemma 1 implies that ~H (	) > ~H (1) > ~H
 
	

, as
	 < 1 < 	.21
3.3 Self-Conrming Immigration Policy
We focus on self-conrming equilibria à la Fudenberg-Levine (1993a). For country H an
equilibrium is dened as a conguration in which (i) the policy maker chooses the immigration
policy which maximizes her objective function given her (correct) beliefs on the migratory
inows, (ii) foreign workers make their migration choice to maximize their utility for given
immigration policy (H). Our results are summarized in the following
Proposition 2. Three policy equilibria exist in country H: 1. The "high-skill boom"
equilibrium, where the policy in H is softer, ~H
 
	
  soft < ^, and the proportion of
skilled migrants over native workforce as well as welfare are higher than in the rest of the
receiving region R (crowding in). 2. The "globally optimal policy" equilibrium, in which
the policy ~H (1) = ^, the proportion of skilled migrants over native workforce as well as
welfare are equal to those in R. 3. The "unskilled migration trap" equilibrium, in which
the policy in H is tighter, ~H (	)  tight > ^, and the proportion of skilled migrants over
native workforce as well as welfare are lower in country H than in the rest of the receiving
region (crowding out).
A graphical intuition of this result is provided in Figure 4, where the two schedules,
capturing the pool of high-skill foreign workers and the politically optimal immigration policy,
intersect in three points, which constitute the policy equilibria of country H.
INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE
21The curve ~H (	H) in Figure 3 has been drawn under the assumption that the optimal policy is an interior
solution. The proof of Lemma 1 in appendix, however, does not rely on that assumption.
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In this model, expectations are self-fullling. In a country where the dominant belief is
that few skilled migrants will enter, the government sets a restrictive immigration policy. A
restrictive policy, in turn, "scares" - at least some - skilled foreign workers who prefer to
migrate to other countries in the region. This creates a trap with few skilled migrants in
H and lower welfare compared to the rest of the receiving region. The opposite -i.e. good-
equilibrium with high skilled immigration and higher welfare would be triggered by a positive
belief on high skilled immigration (and its welfare e¤ects). Finally, the third possibility is
that a country expects the same proportion of high-skill migrants over native population as
in the rest of the region. In this case, the equilibrium implies that the policy and the welfare
in country H are exactly as in region R, and beliefs are again vindicated.
A Cournot tatonnement argument suggests that the "high-skill boom" and the "unskilled
trap" are locally stable equilibria, while the "globally optimal policy" equilibrium is unstable.
The very existence of the latter indeed, crucially hinges on an assumption "disciplining" the
number of high-skill migrants when H = ^. Under that policy high-skill migrants are
indi¤erent as to where to migrate. For reasons of symmetric migratory behavior across
the receiving region, we have found it reasonable to assume that 	H = 1. If that were
not the case, however, the equilibrium would disappear. Moreover, a small perturbation of
this behavior makes the economy diverge towards either of the two equilibria (depending on
whether that perturbation is positive or negative). Consider a  perturbation of 	H = 1,
for a however small real number . If  > 0, for Lemma 1 the government reacts by slightly
softening its immigration policy, that is, ~H (1 + ) < ^. Skilled migrants respond to this
policy by crowding in country H, which in turn leads the policy maker to set up ~H = 
soft.
The economy then converges to the high-skill boom equilibrium. Conversely, if  < 0 the
government sets up a slightly tighter immigration policy. As a consequence, skilled migrants
crowd out of country H, the policy maker sets up ~H = 
tight, and the economy converges
to the unskilled migration trap. This sequential discrete tatonnement process is captured
graphically in Figure 5.
INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE
Finally notice that our extension has brought about rather di¤erent results from the
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baseline model. First, the globally optimal policy equilibrium, which is the only equilibrium
of the benchmark model, is unstable, and its existence crucially hinges on the assumption of
complete symmetry. Secondly, two new policy equilibria emerge, the high-skill boom and the
unskilled migration trap. As discussed in the next subsection, these equilibria respectively
rationalize the formation of a pro- and an anti-immigration prejudice. A situation that could
never materialize in the standard model of immigration policy.
3.4 Endogenous Immigration Prejudices
We interpret our policy equilibria as self-conrming equilibria in the sense of Fudenberg and
Levine (1993a).22 In a self-conrming equilibrium each player plays her best response to her
beliefs on the opponents behavior, and beliefs must be correct along the equilibrium path.
The peculiarity of this equilibrium is that it is in fact compatible with incorrect beliefs o¤
the equilibrium path, also called "superstitions". The self-conrming equilibrium is a gen-
eralization of the Nash equilibrium, whose rationale can be briey explained as follows. If
it is true that "non-cooperative equilibria should be interpreted as the outcome of a learn-
ing process, in which players revise their beliefs using their observations of previous play"
(Fudenberg-Levine, 1993a, p. 523), the concept of self-conrming equilibrium captures the
idea that players tend to learn - and hence to have correct beliefs on - their opponentsbe-
havior along the path followed by the equilibrium but not (necessarily) in contingencies that
are in fact never played.
If we follow this logic, the "anti-immigration prejudice" may be interpreted as the pol-
icy makers conviction that the pool of skilled foreign workers potentially entering country
H simply be SF	. This conviction in fact contains a "superstition" (namely, an o¤-the-
equilibrium incorrect belief), that when the policy maker sets up a soft immigration policy,
the pool of high-skill foreign workers will still be SF	. Indeed, that is not the case, since
the size of the pool is disciplined by (14). The policy maker of a country which is stuck in
an unskilled migration trap, however, ignores it, and the reason why she ignores it is that
she never observes it. The only thing she observes is what happens along the equilibrium
22The self-conrming equilibrium has recently found several applications in the macroeconomic literature.
For instance, Sargent et al. (2006) develop a theory of ination based on this concept. In Alesina and Angeletos
(2005), the two policy equilibria - the European high-redistribution equilibrium and the US low-redistribution
equilibrium - may also be interpreted as self-conrming equilibria. For a concise review of macroeconomic
applications of this concept refer to Fudenberg and Levine (2007).
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path, in which the pool of high-skill foreign workers is SF	. In other words, no evidence
ever emerges which contradicts the policy makers belief, which can in principle be sustained
forever to the extent that play follows the equilibrium path.
An analogous interpretation could be given to the "pro-immigration prejudice". Driven
by the optimistic belief that most skilled foreign workers will target country H (SF	), the
policy maker sets up a soft policy which will in fact attract most skilled immigrants. Notice,
however, that this is not the only possible interpretation of the high-skill boom equilibrium.
In fact, this solution does not need any o¤ the equilibrium "superstition" and can be sustained
as a subgame-perfect equilibrium.
One might argue that a policy maker which is stuck into the unskilled migration trap might
experiment alternative paths and eventually learn her mistake. As argued by Fudenberg and
Levine (1993b), superstitions may vanish if players are patient enough to carry out a su¢ cient
amount of experimentation o¤ the equilibrium. In our theoretical framework, deviating from
the restrictive policy could in principle help the policy maker learn the migratory behavior of
free skilled foreign workers (as captured by (14)), and thus eradicate the superstition. Notice,
however, that a "timid" reduction of migratory restrictions would not be su¢ cient to reach
this goal. As is apparent from Figure 5, along the unskilled migration trap the policy maker
-implementing policy tight- always observes 	HSF = 	SF , and any "experimentation" in
the whole "policy region" between tight and ^ would not bring any evidence of 	H 6= 	.
In other words, unless the policy maker opens up migration policy at or above ^, she will
never observe any change in the pool of skilled foreign workers targeting H. Under the
principle that "you learn what you observe", the policy maker would then need to soften
"remarkably" her immigration policy to be able to learn her mistake. This sizeable shift in
immigration policy might not be easy to attain, especially when observing that in the real
world (1) high-skill foreign workers do not respond instantaneously to changes in immigration
policy, which may render the real learning process far more complex and slow than suggested
in our simple stylized world, (2) patience may not be a major virtue of policy makers who,
along the unskilled migration trap, must respond to the votershostility towards immigration
(Facchini-Mayda, 2008).
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4 Robustness of Results and Extensions
The self-fullling mechanism we have identied above relies on two key assumptions: in our
model high-skill foreign workers are assumed to be i) more productive and ii) more "mobile"
than low-skill workers. The particular form which these two hypotheses take in our framework
is however immaterial. For instance, we have incorporated hypothesis i) by supposing that
low skill migrants are a scal burden for native population, while high skill migrants benet
the receiving economy via a standard labor market e¤ect (that is, by rasing capitalistsrents
by more than lowering workerswages). Whether the labor market e¤ect is relevant or not
is indeed the subject of a growing empirical literature and is still highly controversial.23 It is
however irrelevant for our purposes: we could have equivalently built a model where physical
capital adjusts completely and instantaneously (and thus without any e¤ect on wages and
rents) and where the benet from high-skill migrants might for instance run through a human
capital positive externality channel. Even in that framework, it would still be true that, if
the policy maker expects a relatively low number of (more benecial) high-skill migrants,
she nds it rational to set up a relatively restrictive immigration policy, which crowds out
(more mobile) high-migrants and conrms initial pessimistic beliefs. In other words, the logic
behind the self-fullling mechanism would remain unaltered.
We now explicitly discuss three extensions to our framework. First, we consider the case
where low-skill immigrants have both a negative e¤ect (due to rising welfare costs) and a
positive e¤ect (through the production process) on the receiving country. Second, we discuss
how our results extend to a di¤erent model where the elasticity of substitution between
high-skill and low-skill workers is not innite. Finally, we analyze the case of discriminatory
immigration restrictions.
Even though less productive than high-skill migrants, low-skill migrants may still have a
positive e¤ect on receiving countries. If "u 2 (0; "s), low-skill migrants increase the e¤ective
foreign labor supply, which now equals
LF = "

s
s

SF + "

u
u

UF ;
23Among many others we may cite Borjas (2003), which nds evidence of a relatively sizeable e¤ect of
immigration on native wages and Ottaviano and Peri (2006), which instead does not.
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where the threshold is u = (wH   w) "u   H + u. In this case, a surge in low-skill
immigration in the host country implies increasing welfare costs, but also an increase in
the e¤ective labor supply, and hence in the potential benets arising through this channel.
Although analytically more cumbersome, this extension would bring the same qualitative
results to the extent that the equilibrium immigration policy still implies a partial restriction
to the migrantsincoming ows (that is, to the extent that the policy problem still admits
an interior solution). The two key assumptions recalled above, which drive the self-fullling
mechanism, would still hold in this new framework (as "u < "s and u > 0), and we would
obtain the same results whenever the new benets associated with low-skill migrants are not
so high as to always more than o¤set the welfare costs.24
The technology that we employ does not allow for complementarities between domestic
skilled (unskilled) workers and foreign unskilled (skilled) migrants. With production function
(1) (and under "u > 0), any increase in immigration (skilled or unskilled) reduces domestic
wages by augmenting the foreign component of the labor supply. The negative e¤ect on labor
income of high and low skill domestic workers is more than compensated by the positive e¤ect
on the rental rate of capital that natives own. As standard in these models, the immigration
surplus -as this net e¤ect is often referred to- arises because of the complementarities that
exist between migrants and native-owned capital.
Consider now the alternative linear homogeneous technology which is also often used to
study immigration:
Y = f (K;S;U) ;
where S and U are respectively the total (i.e. native plus foreign) number of skilled and
unskilled workers.25 This technology satises the following standard assumptions: fi > 0,
fii < 0 and fij > 0 (where i; j = S;U), that is, the two types of labor are complementary
in production. Is it still true that high-skill migrants are more benecial for the destination
economy than low-skill migrants? As discussed by Borjas (1995), the answer to this ques-
tion depends on the complementarity between the xed factor (here, capital) and skilled and
24We have only briey discussed the intuition of this case. A complete analytical treatment is however
available from the authors upon request.
25For simplicity assume that foreign (un)skilled are identical to native (un)skilled.
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unskilled labor, as well as on the skill composition of the native population. If the comple-
mentarities in production between skilled workers and the xed factor are su¢ ciently strong,
natives gain from an improvement in the skill composition of migrants, even if the domestic
labor force is predominantly skilled.26 If this is the case, the logic of our results is unaltered
within this framework. High-skill foreign workers have an unambiguous positive e¤ect on
the receiving country, as they imply a positive immigration surplus. On the other hand,
unskilled foreign workers may have on net a negative e¤ect on the receiving economy, due to
the increase in the cost of welfare programs. As in Section 3, beliefs on the incoming migrant
inows determine immigration restrictions, which in turn inuence migratory decisions of
skilled workers and the welfare e¤ects of immigration.
Finally, consider the case where the government of country H is able to discriminate
between skilled and unskilled immigrants (i.e. lter the more productive workers). If the
immigration policy can be tailored to each skill group, the reasoning inspiring the self-fullling
mechanism breaks down, and the multiplicity of equilibria for the small open country H
disappears. Two cases, however, must be distinguished, depending on whether or not the
rest of the receiving world (region R) also implements a selective policy. In the rst case,
the globally optimal (discriminatory) policy for the entire region will consist of setting no
restriction on high-skill foreign workers, and the highest restrictions on unskilled migrants, so
as to fully o¤set the e¤ect of social policy. Under this immigration policy, all high-skill foreign
workers and no low-skill foreign worker will migrate to region R. In this case, independently
of country Hs beliefs on the skill composition of the migrant labor force, the only policy
equilibrium for country H would simply coincide with the globally optimal (discriminatory)
policy set up in region R. In the second case, the globally optimal policy for region R would
still be R = ^, and the only policy equilibrium for country H would again be "no barrier on
high-skill" and "high barriers on low-skill". Being the only country ltering skills, country
H would then enjoy a higher number of skilled migrants (SF	) and a higher welfare with
respect to region R.
26This conclusion is reinforced in a more general model where human capital of immigrants has external
e¤ects in production.
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5 Conclusion
In most countries there is a heated debate on immigration. The mobility of people across
borders has important e¤ects on both source and destination economies. Within the receiving
part of the world, for instance, several issues are at the forefront of public discussion and of
academic research, including the performance of immigrants and their ability to integrate in
the destination country, the impact of migrants on nativesemployment opportunities, the
proper design of social and labor market policy in presence of immigration. We have focused
on host economies (that is, we have not addressed the e¤ects of a diaspora on the source
countries) and abstracted from several of these important issues.
This paper provides a model to investigate how attitudes towards immigration and im-
migration policy interact with migratory decisions. We have shown that in a setting where
high skilled foreign workers are more productive and more mobile than unskilled migrants,
di¤erent perceptions on immigration lead to radically di¤erent outcomes. Optimistic beliefs
on immigration induce a government to set low restrictions which attract high-skill foreign
workers, while pessimistic beliefs bring high restrictions which scare skilled immigrants. This
self-fullling mechanism will sustain the endogenous formation of a prejudice, pro or anti
immigration. While clearly not the only explanation, our work sheds some light on why
di¤erences in attitudes towards immigration may be so rooted in di¤erent countries.
This analysis contributes to the discussion on the proper design of immigration policy in
host countries. The model implies that the choice of the right policy may have a signicant
impact in the short run, as well as in the long run through the formation of attitudes towards
immigration that will change only slowly. First, the small open economy setting helps us
clarifying that a country must be careful in implementing restrictive immigration policies to
control the migration ow. The reason is that migration policies a¤ect not only the number
of immigrants but also their quality, and a (non-selective) restrictive policy could indirectly
act as an instrument of selection of the lowest quality immigrants. Secondly, while skills of
foreign workers may be di¢ cult to infer correctly, several arguments have been proposed in
favor of policies that lter applicants in terms of observable skills. This paper adds to these
arguments that selective policies may inuence nativesattitude towards immigration and,
hence, increase support for further reductions of barriers. In principle an anti-immigration
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prejudice could "vanish" via a combination of rules that favor more productive migrants with
a more open immigration policy.
As a nal remark, notice that several extensions of this model shall provide interesting
novel insights on the e¤ects of immigration policy under self-selection of migrants. Two direc-
tions may be of particular interest as they better describe real-world environments di¤erent
from the one analyzed in this paper. A rst extension shall consider how immigration policy
in one country a¤ects policy choices in other countries of the destination region. A second
direction shall address how the joint determination of immigration and social policy in the
receiving country inuences beliefs and outcomes. We leave this for future work.
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A Denitions and Preliminary Results
This appendix provides some denitions and establishes some useful preliminary results.
A.1 E¤ects of a Restriction of Immigration Policy in the Standard Model
Comparative statics analysis of immigration policy can be summarized in the following
Lemma A1. A restriction of immigration policy in the home economy (i.e. increasing
H) 1. decreases equilibrium e¤ective labor by reducing immigration ( dL=dH < 0); 2.
increases the domestic equilibrium wage rate ( dwH=dH > 0); 3. reduces the rent on the
xed factor ( drH=dH < 0); 4. reduces unskilled migration ( du=dH < 0) and skilled
migration ( ds=dH < 0).
Proof.
1. We rst show that LF is decreasing in H . From the labor market equilibrium condition
(11) we obtain the implicit function for LF as
F (LF ; H)  LF   "s
h
(1  )

K
LH+LF
   wi "s   H

SF = 0:
We then use the implicit function theorem and obtain
dLF
dH
=  
"s

SF
1 + (1  )  KL  1L ("s)2 SF < 0:
Given that L = LH + LF and that LH is exogenous, it follows dL=dH < 0.
2. In order to nd dwH=dH we rst need to characterize the implicit function for wH ,
which is the following:
F (wH ; H)  (1  )
"
K
LH + "s
(wH w)"s H

SF
#
  wH = 0:
Di¤erentiating wH with respect to H we obtain
dwH
dH
=
(1  )  KL  1L"s SF
(1  )  KL  1L ("s)2 SF + 1 ;
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which is always strictly higher than zero, conrming that an increase in H leads to a higher
wage rate.
3. In point 1 we have proven that dL=dH < 0. Given that rH =  (K=L)
 1, and that
@rH=@L > 0, it follows drH=dH < 0.
4. The e¤ect on the supply of unskilled foreign migrants of an increase in H can be
immediately calculated:
du
dH
=  1 < 0: (15)
The rst derivative of s with respect to H can be computed as follows:
ds
dH
=
@s
@H
+
@s
@wH
dwH
dH
;
where dwH=dH is given in point 2, @s=@H =  1 and @s=@wH = "s. It is now easy to
show that
ds
dH
=   1
(1  )  KL  1L ("s)2 SF + 1 < 0: (16)
A.2 "Open Door" and "Closed Door" Policies
Lemma A1 is true to the extent that immigration policy is not already at one of its two
boundary values. In fact, in our formulation there exist an upper and a lower bound beyond
which a change in H has no e¤ect on the number of migrants. For instance, if H is
such that all foreign workers are already willing to enter, a further decrease has no e¤ect
on immigration. Symmetrically, if H is such that no foreign worker is willing to enter, a
further increase has no e¤ect on immigration either. Let us now dene these lower and upper
bounds. We dene "open door" policy (H) and "closed door" policy (H) as the policies
which induce, respectively, all foreign workers and no foreign worker to emigrate to H.27
The "closed door" policy is implicitly dened by
H = max fu; (wH (H)  w) "sg ;
27Notice also that, since the policy maker faces no cost in lowering H below H or raising H above H ;
and that migration ows are una¤ected by that decrease/increase, in principle any H < H and any H > H
represent respectively an "open door" and a "closed door" policy. We restrict H to belong to
h
H ; H
i
.
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where H = u and H = (wH (H)  w) "s are, by construction, the immigration policies
respectively dissuading all unskilled and all skilled foreign workers from emigrating to country
H. When H = H , population in H is only made up of natives (L = LH and u = 0), and it
is easy to calculate the numerical value for welfare as (for a denition of welfare see Subsection
2.3)
WH = K
L1 H [a+ (1  a) (1  )] :
The "open door" policy is the one associated with the maximum number of skilled mi-
grants, which is SF . In order for this to be the case, H must be set so that s = , that
is, so that all skilled foreign workers nd it protable to migrate. The following equation
implicitly denes the "open door" policy for receiving country H:
H =

wH(H)  w

"s   :
In this case population in H is made up of both natives and (all) foreigners (L  L =
LH + "

sSF and u = ). The numerical value for welfare is given by
WH = K
L1 

a+ (1  a) (1  ) LH
L
  (1  a) uUF

:
Whether WH 7 WH , and hence whether the "open door" policy is better than the "closed
door" policy depends on the parameters of the economy.
A.3 The Politically Optimal Immigration Policy in the Standard Model
Lemma A2. The politically optimal degree of restrictiveness of immigration policy ( ^)
depends on both the distributional concerns of the policy maker ( a) and on the generosity
of social policy ( u). There always exist combinations of parameters a and u for which
the policy maker partially limits migratory inows by optimally trading o¤ the costs and the
benets from immigration, - that is, for which ^ 2

H ; H

. Moreover, the higher 1   a
and/or u, the more restrictive the politically optimal policy.
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Proof. The policy problem consists of maximizing the following condition
WH = a  rHK + (1  a) 

wHLH   u
u

UF

s:t: H 2
h
H ; H
i
;
where wH = (1  ) (K=L), rH =  (K=L) 1 and u = u   H . The candidate solutions
to this problem are an interior maximum, ^ 2

H ; H

, and the two corner solutions, that
is, the "open door" (H) and the "closed door" policy (H).
To characterize an interior solution to the maximum problem we need to compute the
rst and the second order conditions. The total derivative of WH with respect to H can be
expressed as
dWH
dH
=
dWH
dL
 dL
dH
+
@WH
@H
where
@WH
@H
= (1  a) u
UF

> 0
dL
dH
=  
"s

SF
1 + (1  )  KL  1L ("s)2 SF < 0;
and
dWH
dL
= (1  )

K
L
 
a  (1  a)LH
L

S 0:
The FOC can then be expressed as
dWH
dH
= (1  a) u
UF

 
(1  )  KL  ha  (1  a)LHL i "s SF
1 + (1  )  KL  1L ("s)2 SF = 0 (17)
where the rst and the second term respectively represent the marginal costs (of a reduction in
H) in terms of social policy, and the marginal benets (if positive) in terms of production.
From (17) notice that marginal benets are positive only when a > LHL =

LH
L + 1

. A
su¢ cient condition for this to happen for any L > LH would be to assume a  1=2.
To check the second order condition, let us now calculate the second derivative of the
governments objective function with respect to H :
d2WH
d2H
=
d2WH
dL2
dL
dH
:
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After some algebra we obtain
d2WH
d2H
=  
d
dH
h
a  (1  a)LHL
i
+  1
L2
dL
dH
[(1  a)LH + a"s]
1
L"

s + 1
2 ;
where
 (H)  (1  )

K
L

"s
SF

> 0;
d
dH
=   (1  )2

K
L

"s
SF

1
L
dL
dH
> 0;
and where the expression for dL=dH < 0 is already given above.
Since neither the FOC nor the SOC can be solved explicitly for H , a complete characteri-
zation of the solution cannot be carried out. To prove the existence of economies characterized
by a global interior maximum, we then look for a su¢ cient condition. To give an intuition,
we will now prove that there exist values of a 2 (0; 1) and u > 0 such that the FOC is
satised at an interior ^ and the welfare function is everywhere strictly concave.
By plugging the expressions for d=dH , dL=dH and  (H) into d
2WH=d
2
H we obtain
that
d2WH
d2H
< 0() a >


LH
L + 1



LH
L + 1

+ LHL   1L"s
 a(H): (18)
A su¢ cient condition to have a(H) < 1 8H is that LH >
h
(1  ) (K) ("s)2 SF
i 1
+1
,
which only depends on parameters and in fact ensures LH=L   (1=L)"s > 0. Hence, for
any a 2 (a(H); 1), d2WH=d2H < 0 everywhere, and the welfare function is strictly concave.
Let us now consider the rst order condition. Indeed there always exists a u > 0 such
that dWH=dH = 0 whenever the second term in (17) is positive. As we have seen above,
a su¢ cient condition for this to happen is that a  1=2. Since a(H) T 1=2, then for any
a 2 f(a(H); 1) \ (1=2; 1)g, there always exists a positive u such that dWH=dH = 0. For
all these economies the welfare function admits a global interior maximum, ^ 2

H ; H

.
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We now prove that ^ () is increasing in u and decreasing in a, that is:
d^
du
=  
dG
du
dG
d^
> 0 and
d^
da
=  
dG
da
dG
d^
< 0
where G is the implicit function in ^ derived from the FOC (dWH=d^ = 0). We already
know that dG=d^ = d2WH=d^2 < 0. Since dG=du = (1  a)UF = > 0, then it will be
d^=du > 0. Moreover
dG
da
=  
(1  )  KL  h1 + LHL i "s SF
1 + (1  )  KL  1L ("s)2 SF < 0
implies d^=da < 0.
B Proofs of Main Results
B.1 Proof of Lemma 1
The policy maker in H has the following maximization problem:
max
H
WH = max
H

a  rHK + (1  a) 

wHLH   u
u

UF

;
s:t: H 2
h
H ; H
i
where H , H denote respectively the "open door" and the "closed door" policy for country
H and are dened analogously to the benchmark model (see Appendix A2).28 The expression
for welfare can be rewritten as
WH =
"
a  

K
LH + LF
 1
K + (1  a) 

(1  )

K
LH + LF

LH   u
u

UF
#
;
where we used the conditions for factor prices from the main text. Finally, recall that expected
foreign labor supply is such that
LF = "

s
s

SF	H :
28 Incidentally notice that, while H = H , H 6= H since it depends on 	.
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We now proceed as in the benchmark model to obtain the following rst-order condition:
dWH
dH
= (1  a) u
UF

 
H (	H ; H)
h
a  (1  a)LHL
i
1 + H (	H ; H)
"s
L
= 0; (19)
where
H (	H ; H)  (1  )

K
L
 "s

SF	H > 0;
The second derivative of welfare with respect to H is
d2WH
d2H
=  
dH
dH
h
a  (1  a)LHL
i
+ H
1
L2
dL
dH
[(1  a)LH + aH"s]
1
LH"

s + 1
2 ;
where
dH
dH
=   (1  )2

K
L
 "s

SF	H
1
L
dL
dH
> 0
and
dL
dH
=  
"s

SF	H
(1  )  KL  1L ("s)2 SF	H + 1 < 0:
For simplicity, rst consider the case in which the global maximum is an interior point for
any 	H in

	;	

. Then the locus of points of interior maxima ~H (	H) is implicitly given
by (19). Denote it by G (~H ;	H). In order to prove our statement we need to show that
d~H
d	H
=  
dG
d	H
dG
d~H
< 0:
First notice that dG=d~H = d
2WH=d~
2
H < 0 as ~H is an interior maximum for any 	H . Let
us now analyze dG=d	H . After some algebra we obtain
dG
d	H
=  
dH
d	H
h
a  (1  a)LHL
i
+ H
1
L2
dL
d	H
[(1  a)LH + aH"s]
1
LH"

s + 1
2 < 0;
since
dL
d	H
=
"s
es

SF
H
1
L"

s + 1
> 0
and
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dH
d	H
= (1  )

K
L
 "s

SF

1   1
L
	H
dL
d	H

> 0:
Since both dG=d~H < 0 and dG=d	H < 0, then it will be d~H=d	H < 0, and hence ~H (	H)
is a strictly decreasing function of 	H for any 	H in

	;	

.
Under the weaker assumption that only ~H (	H = 1) = ^ be an interior maximum (see
proof of Lemma A2 for a su¢ cient condition), the reasoning above can be repeated identically
in a neighborhood of 	H = 1. In that neighborhood ~H (	H) is a decreasing function of 	H .
The only di¤erence is that now we are not guaranteed that the optimal policy be an interior
maximum for any 	H in

	;	

. It may happen that there exist (1) a threshold value
	o 2 (1;	] above which it is optimal to set an "open door" policy, (2) a threshold value
	c 2 [	; 1) below which it is optimal to set a "closed door" policy. The function ~H (	H)
will then be weakly decreasing, in the sense of being strictly decreasing in 	H 2 [	c;	o],
and constant in both [	;	c) and (	o;	].
B.2 Proof of Proposition 2
We start by nding the three equilibria, then we show that they can be Pareto ranked.
1a. The globally optimal policy equilibrium. We have assumed that, when the policy
maker sets up the globally optimal policy, ~H = ^, then in country H it is 	H = 1 and
hence SF	H = SF (which is meant to capture the idea that skilled migrants distribute
uniformly along the receiving region R). On the other hand, when the government expects
SF	H = SF , the best policy coincides with the globally optimal policy, ~H = ^ (the two
maximum problems for small open country H and region R would coincide). The point
(~H = ^;	H = 1) then satises our denition of equilibrium. Given the same policy, the
proportion of skilled migrants over natives is

^s (^) =

SF = (SH + UH) for both country H
and region R.29
1b,c. High-skill boom and unskilled migration trap. The mechanics of the behavior of
skilled foreign workers is such that, when H < ^ then 	H = 	 > 1, and when H > ^
then 	H = 	 < 1. On the other hand, the policy makers best response function ~H () is
29Recall that, given our assumptions on countries H,F being zero-measure countries inside regions R;S,
both of measure [0; 1], then (1) SH + UH stand for both the mass of native workers in country H, and the
number of native workers for the whole region, R; (2) SF + UF stand for both the mass of foreign workers in
F and the number of foreign workers in the whole region, S.
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a continuous, strictly decreasing function in 	H 2

	;	

(as proven in Lemma 2), which
takes value ~H () = ^ when 	H = 1 (as proven above). These elements ensure that, when
	H = 	 > 1, then 9 ~H
 
	
  soft > ^, and when	H = 	 < 1, then 9 ~H (	)  tight > ^.
The two points (tight;	), (soft;	) satisfy our denition of equilibrium.
Under the high-skill boom equilibrium the proportion of skilled migrants over natives is
higher for country H than for region R as
~s(soft)

SF	
SH + UH
>
^s(^)

SF
(SH + UH)
as ~s

soft

> ^s (^) and 	 > 1:
Under the unskilled migration trap the proportion of skilled migrants over natives is lower
for country H than for region R as
~s(tight)

SF	
SH + UH
<
^s(^)

SF
(SH + UH)
as ~s

tight

< ^s (^) and 	 > 1:
2. We now prove that the three equilibria can be ranked in terms of welfare from the
lowest - unskilled migration trap - to the highest - the high-skill boom equilibrium. First
notice that, under our condition that skilled migrants are benecial for the receiving economy
(a > LHL =

LH
L + 1

, see proof of Lemma A1), aggregate welfare is an increasing function of
	H :
dWH
d	H
= (1  )

K
L
 @L
@	H

a  (1  a)LH
L

> 0; (20)
as @L=@	H > 0. It is then immediate to prove that welfare under the high-skill boom
equilibrium (WH
 
soft;	

) is unambiguously higher than welfare under global optimal policy
equilibrium (WH (^; 1)). In fact, (i) since 	 > 1, (20) implies that welfare is higher when
	H = 	 and with the same immigration policy (WH
 
^;	

> WH (^; 1)); (ii) ^ is, however,
a sub-optimal policy when 	H = 	 since, as we have seen above, welfare is maximized when
~H
 
	
  soft > ^ (that is, WH  soft;	 > WH  ^;	). Hence it will be WH  soft;	 >
WH (^; 1).
Analogously, it is possible to prove that welfare under unskilled migration trap (WH
 
tight;	

)
is unambiguously lower than welfare under global optimal policy equilibrium (WH (^; 1)). In
fact, (i) under the same immigration policy tight, it is WH
 
tight;	

< WH
 
tight; 1

as
	 < 1; (ii) tight is a sub-optimal policy when 	H = 	, and henceWH
 
tight; 1

< WH (^; 1).
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We then conclude that WH
 
tight;	

< WH (^; 1). Finally, notice that condition (20) holds
for a  1=2 (that is, also when a = 1=2 -i.e. when political weights on capitalists and workers
in the objective function of the government are identical). This implies that the above proof
is valid for both government welfare and social welfare in H.
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Figure 1: The equilibrium in the labor market
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Figure 2: Crowding in and crowding out of skilled immigrants as a function of immigraiton
policy.
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Figure 3: The politically optimal immigration policy in country H as a function of 	H :
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Figure 4: The three policy equilibria.
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Figure 5: Tatonnement stability of equilibria.
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